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INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ARBITRATION IN THE USSR
AND EASTERN EUROPE
VRATISLA V PECHOTA *

Arbitration in the Soviet Union and its homologue in the West are
two concepts separated by a common legal language. Although the two
arbitral systems make use of the same notions, many of these notions
acquire different meanings when applied in the other setting.
In the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, arbitration is a process
whereby appointed individuals (to whom the arbitration task is entrusted) exercise a judicial function in reaching their decisions. The
Soviet and Eastern European concept is not only legalistic, but also
prefers institutional settings over ad hoc arrangements.' The institutional paradigm in the East conforms with a social and economic life
that detests improvisation in general.
In Eastern Europe and the USSR, arbitration is considered a particular form of jurisprudence, and not a private matter. It is a substitute for an action at law. Arbitral procedure, however, is not simply
another means of adjudicating disputes. It is also an important method
of enforcing planning directives in the socialist economy. In the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe, economic activity is carried on by public
enterprises controlled by the government. In most cases, only stateowned enterprises may engage in transnational commerce or industrial
cooperation. Each country's economic plan, which has the force of law,
requires smooth performance on all levels of activity. Non-fulfillment
of contractual or other obligations is of concern not only to the parties,
* Assistant Director, Parker School of Foreign and Comparative Law, Lecturer in

Law, Columbia University.
1. See Samuels, The Soviet Position on International Arbitration: A Wealth of
Choices or Choices for the Wealthy, 27 VA. J. INT'L L. 417, 421 (1986).
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but touches the public nerve as well.
In this sense, arbitration is a public response to dysfunction in the
economic sphere. Recourse to arbitration is not truly voluntary, since
more often than not, the parties to an economic dispute have a legal
obligation to arbitrate. 2 For all practical purposes, the choice between
arbitration and court adjudication is non-existent, since the courts lack
jurisdiction over economic disputes involving public enterprises.3 Thus,
in most instances, arbitration looms as the only and inevitable course
the parties to a contract can take when a controversy arises.
Although arbitration and court adjudication are not alternative
means of deciding issues in dispute, with each operating in a sphere
closed to the other, the two systems do have many common features.
While their powers remain separated, a unity of purpose accounts for
the fact that arbitral institutions are modeled on the court system and
that many rules of arbitral procedure are derived from the principles
governing civil litigation.
I. Two

DISTINCT TYPES

oF

ECONOMIC ARBITRATION

Arbitration in the Soviet Union and most Eastern European countries consists of two separate and unrelated systems: domestic economic arbitration and foreign trade arbitration. While this article focuses on the latter, it will be of interest to observe how the former has
the potential to influence foreign trade arbitration.
In the Soviet Union, the domestic economic arbitration system is
represented by a network of state agencies whose primary task is to
settle economic disputes among Soviet enterprises subordinated to different governmental departments. Most of these controversies arise in
connection with the conclusion and execution of economic contracts.
An individual or the state arbitration agency may initiate arbitration if
an enterprise has deviated from its assigned purposes or has violated
the law or its contractual obligations. Moreover, the state arbitration
agency has the authority to void contracts that are contrary to law or
planning orders, and, at the request of either party to a contract, the
state agency also has the power to enforce the obligations of a contract.
The party submitting a dispute to arbitration must show that it sought
an agreed solution but that the conciliation attempt failed.
As a rule, a case is heard before a sole arbitrator who is a professional adjudicator and civil servant. This arbitrator is appointed to
hear the case by the chairman of the state arbitration agency, and not
by the parties. His primary task is to assist the parties in reaching an
2. Id. at 425.
3. See id. at n.37.
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agreement. Where a compromise cannot be reached or where public
interest so demands, the arbitrator hears the evidence and decides the
case in the same manner as would a judge. He may award damages and
even impose penalties, and his decision is final and binding upon the
parties. His award is enforceable by virtue of an order issued by the
arbitrator along with the decision. This order may require that the
bank in which the unsuccessful party holds its assets transfer the
amount of damages or penalty from that party's account either to the
winning party or to the state treasury, depending on the case. The orprinciples of procedure are outganization, authority and fundamental
4
legislation.
special
in
lined
State economic arbitration in the Soviet Union and in other countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) is
designed to ensure compliance with obligations under the state plan
and contracts. The authority of the arbitration agencies is not derived
from the consent of the parties, but rather flows from the regulatory
power of the government. These arbitral agencies have no counterparts
in the West, where arbitral systems are based on voluntary agreements
to arbitrate. In countries such as Czechoslovakia and Poland, the nationalization of private industries has led to state economic arbitration
replacing the commercial courts as a means of settling commercial
disputes.
Foreign trade arbitration is a separate arbitral system comprised
of arbitral institutions for general economic cases and special tribunals
that handle particular categories of disputes, such as maritime cases."
4. Law Concerning State Arbitration in the USSR of November 30, 1979, Ved. Verkh.
Soy. SSSR (1979) No. 49, item 844, as amended by the Decree of the Presidium of the
USSR Supreme Soviet of Dec. 30, 1987, Ved. Verkh. Sov. SSSR (1988) No. 1, item 3. See
YURIDICHESKII ENTSIKLOPEDICHESKII SLOVAR' 67-68 (1984) for a full description of the
contemporary system of state economic arbitration. See also T.E. ABOVA, ARBITRAZHNYI
PROTSESS V

SSSR:

PONIATIE, OSNOVNYE PRINCIPY

(1985).

5. See R. BYSTRICKY, LE DROIT DE L'INTEGRATION ECONOMIQUE SOCIALISTE 280 (1979).
6. For a discussion of the Soviet and East European concept of foreign trade arbitration, see Hanfik, Arbitration in Socialist Countries,44 ARE. 180 (1978); Jakubowski, Ar-

bitration in the CMEA, in AssOCIAZIONE ITALIANA PER ARBITRATO, ESSAYS IN MEMORIAM
EUGENIO MINOLI 238 (1974); Juhasz, Arbitration in the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance, 24 ACTA JURIDICA AcADEMIAE SCIENTIARUM HUNGARICAE 105 (1982); 1.0.
KHLESTOVA, ARBITRAZH VO VNESHNEEKONOMICHESKIKH OTNOSHENIAKH STRAN-CHLENOV

(1980); S.N.

LEBEDEV, MEZHDUNARODNYI TORGOVYI ARBITRAZH

SEV

(1965); Lebedev, Interna-

tional Commercial Arbitration in the Socialist Countries Members of the CMEA, 158
RECUEIL DES COURS 87 (1977); HANDBOOK ON FOREIGN TRADE ARBITRATION IN THE CMEA
COUNTRIES (S.N. Lebedev ed. 1983); LEBEDEV, U.S.S.R. 2 INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (P. Sanders ed. 1984) [hereinafter HANDBOOK COM. ARB.];

Lebedevs Pozdnyakov, U.S.S.R, I Y.B. CoM. ARE. 91 (1976); Lew, The Structure and

Role of Arbitration in Eastern Europe, 44

ARB.

213 (1978) A.I.

MINAKOV, ARBITRAZHNYE
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Both types of tribunals are permanent courts of arbitration created by
law, with jurisdictional and procedural rules linking them to the judicial system. There is an arbitration court for commercial disputes in
each country, usually located in the capital city and affiliated with the
national chamber of commerce. 7 There are special arbitration courts
for maritime cases in Moscow' and Gdynia, Poland. s Specialized arbitration tribunals attached to the Cotton Trade Association and the
Wool Trade Federation have also been established in Gdynia.1" With
SOGLASHENIA I PRAKTIKA RASSMOTRENIYA VNESHNEEKONOMICHESKIKH SPOROV
TOR, PROBLEME PRIVIND

ARBITRAJUL PENTRU

(1985); I.

NES-

COMERTUL EXTERIOR IN TARILE SOCIALISTE

(1972); Osakwe, The Soviet Positionon InternationalCommercial Arbitration
RESOLVING TRANSNATIONAL DisPUTES THROUGH INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 184 (T. Carbonneau ed. 1984); Pechota,
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 2A World Arb. Rep. (Butter.) 2625 (1987); Pisar,
The Communist System of Foreign Trade Adjudication, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1959);
Pozdnyakov, Commercial Arbitration in CMEA Member Countries, 4 INT'L TAX & Bus.
LAW. 272 (1986); Samuels, supra note 1; J.P. WAEHLER, DIE AUSSENHANDELS-UND
SEE-SCHIEDSGERICHTSBARKEIT IN DER UDSSR (1974).
7. The arbitration courts of those countries are:
(1) Bulgaria: The Arbitration Court at the Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, located in Sofia;
(2) Czechoslovakia: The Arbitration Court of the Czechoslovakia Chamber
of Commerce and Industry, located in Prague;
(3) German Democratic Republic (GDR): The Arbitration Court of the
Chamber for Foreign Trade of the G.D.R., located in Berlin;
(4) Hungary: The Court of Arbitration attached to the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce, located in Budapest;
(5) Poland: The Court of Arbitration at the Polish Chamber of Foreign
Trade, located in Warsaw;
(6) Rumania: The Arbitration Commission of the Chamber of Commerce
and Industry of the Socialist Republic of Rumania, located in
Bucharest; and
(7) USSR: The Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission at the USSR
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, located in Moscow.
In December, 1987, the Commission was renamed the Court of Arbitration at the USSR
Chamber of Commerce and Industry. See Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme
Soviet of Dec. 14, 1987, Ved. Verkh. Sov. SSSR (1987) No. 50, item 806.
8. The Maritime Arbitration Commission at the USSR Chamber of Commerce and
Industry, Moscow. The Commission was created in 1930. See generally Jarvis, The Soviet Maritime Arbitration Commission: A Practitioner'sPerspective, 21 TEX. INT'L L.J.
341 (1986); Lebedev, La Commission d'arbitragemaritime pros de la Chambre de commerce de l'URSS, 1971 REVUE DE L'ARBITRAGE 137; Timmermans, The USSR Maritime
Arbitration Commission, 1987 LLOYD'S MAR. & CoM. L.Q. 350, 468.
9. The International Court for Marine and Inland Navigation, sitting in Gdynia, was
created in 1959 by the chambers of commerce of Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic
Republic, and Poland. See Przetacznik & Pechota, Rules of the International Court of
Arbitration for Marine and Inland Navigation at Gdynia, 3 WORLD ARB. REP. (Butter.)
3728 (1986).
10. See Lisowski, Establishing a New Permanent Court of Arbitration in InternaEUROPENE

as a Method of Resolving TransnationalDisputes, in
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the exception of the Gdynia maritime arbitration tribunal, which was
set up jointly by the chambers of commerce of Czechoslovakia, the
German Democratic Republic and Poland, all other CMEA arbitration
courts are national institutions created under their nation's laws and
composed of their nationals.
All arbitration courts for foreign trade are permanent institutions
that possess independent authority to settle disputes arising from international commerce. The arbitration courts' jurisdiction is established either by an international treaty or by agreement of the parties,
and the caseload is relatively heavy. For example, the Arbitration
Court of the Czechoslovak Chamber of Commerce and Industry in
Prague hears more than 200 cases annually."1 Approximately threefourths of these cases are between foreign trade organizations of
CMEA member countries 1" and the remaining one-fourth involve parties of other nations."1 Both categories of cases-those between parties
from countries with socialist economies and those involving parties
from countries with free-market systems-are dealt with in proceedings governed by identical rules of procedure. Only the Polish Arbitration Court applies separate rules to each category of dispute.
Even though functionally independent, the arbitration courts in
the USSR and Eastern Europe are parts of the mechanism created by
the state for enforcing the monopoly of foreign trade. The chambers of
commerce, to which the arbitration courts are attached, are under the
direct supervision and control of the governmental department responsible for foreign trade. That department, of course, influences in varying degrees the organization, funding and recruitment of arbitration
court personnel. Apparently, each arbitrator's name must be informally
approved by the foreign trade ministry. In addition, the actual rules
under which the arbitration tribunal is organized and conducts its activities must be approved by the governing body of the national chamber of commerce.1 4 Since the tribunals are independent, no supervision
or control extends over their proceedings. 5 There does not appear to
RASSEGNA DELL 'ARBITRATO 31
(1970); Lisowski, Specialist Arbitration Courts in Poland and Their Role in the International Cotton and Wool Trade, in INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, FOURTH INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CONGRESS: PROCEEDINGS 738 (1972).
11. V. SEDLACEK, ARBITRATION IN CZECHOSLOVAK FOREIGN TRADE 89 (1982).
12. As of this writing, the full members of the CMEA are Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Rumania, the
USSR, and Vietnam. See Samuels, supra note 1, at 418 n.7.
13. V. SEDLACEK, supra note 11, at 89.
14. Comp & Lew, The Structure and Role of Arbitration in Eastern Europe, 44 ARB.
213 (1978).
15. See Hanik, Otazky prislusnosti ve svetle judikatury Rozhodciho soudu Ceskos-

tional Wool Commerce at Gdynia Wool Federation, 10

N.Y.L.
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be any evidence that the proceedings are tainted by the tribunals'
proximity to the government, however."6 Impartiality stems from the
specific mandate given to the arbitration courts by their respective
statutes. When cases involve parties from Western countries, impartiality is regarded as a specific contribution that a socialist arbitration
court can make towards peaceful coexistence and cooperation between
nations. This partly explains why the Soviet Union and its allies insisted that the 1975 Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe include an endorsement of international commercial
arbitration as a means of promoting economic cooperation. 7 International commercial arbitration is one of the few areas where Soviet legal
doctrine does not stress the need for ideological approval.

II.

ARBITRATION AS A FUNCTION OF SOCIALIST ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

In 1971 the member-nations of the CMEA adopted a comprehensive program of socialist economic integration.' s This program envislovenske obchodni komory (Problems of Competence in the Jurisdictionof the Arbitration Court at the Czechoslovak Chamber of Commerce), 1 STUDIE Z MEZINARODINIHO
PRAVA 165 (1955).
16. See generally Chew, A Proceduraland Substantive Analysis of the Fairness of
Chinese and Soviet Foreign Trade Arbitrations,21 TEx. INT'L L.J. 291 (1986).
17. The Final Act contains a special provision on arbitration which reads as follows:
The participating States,
Considering that the prompt and equitable settlement of disputes which may
arise from commercial transactions relating to goods and services and contracts
for industrial co-operation would contribute to expanding and facilitating trade
and co-operation,
Considering that arbitration is an appropriate means of settling such
disputes,

recommend, where appropriate, to organizations, enterprises and firms in
their countries, to include arbitration clauses in commercial contracts and industrial co-operation contracts, or in special agreements;
recommend that the provisions on arbitration should provide for arbitration
under a mutually acceptable set of arbitration rules, and permit arbitration in a
third country, taking into account existing intergovernmental and other agreements in this field.
73 DEP'T ST. BULL. 333 (1975).

18. The program defines "socialist economic integration" as
A conscious process planned and controlled by the communist and workers'
parties and governments of the CMEA member countries, fostering the international socialist division of labor, closer harmony of their economies and the establishment of a modern, highly effective economic structure, a gradual harmonization and evening-out of their levels of economic development, the
establishment of deep and lasting ties in the basic economic, scientific and technological branches, the extension and strengthening of their international mar-
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aged, inter alia, mandatory settlement of all intra-bloc commercial disputes by permanent arbitration courts, unification of the rules of
arbitral procedure, and the coordination of national arbitral institutions in an effort to achieve uniformity in the application of community rules regulating economic cooperation and relations in the fields of
science and technology.
The first of these objectives was achieved through international
agreement. Two multilateral instruments, both legally binding upon
the enterprises and economic organizations of CMEA countries, have
provided the legal basis for compulsory arbitral jurisdiction. One agreement, the CMEA General Conditions for the Delivery of Goods,' 9 is a
comprehensive uniform law directly regulating most matters relating to
commercial contracts. Adopted in 1958 and substantially amended in
1968 and 1975, Section 90(1) stipulates that:
[a]ll disputes which may arise from or in connection with the
contract shall be subject, without recourse of law, to consideration by arbitration in an arbitration tribunal established for
such disputes in the country of the defendant or, by agreement
of the parties, in a third member-country of the CMEA.'0
The other agreement, the Moscow Convention of May 26, 1972 on
Settlement by Arbitration of Civil Law Disputes Resulting from Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation," laid the foundation for
a regional system of commercial arbitration that is unparalleled elsewhere.22 This Convention is, in fact, a treaty on jurisdiction in internaket and improved trade and monetary relations.
Morozov, The Socialist Conception of International Organization, in THE CONCEPT OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 188 (Abi-Saab ed. 1981).
19. General Conditions for the Delivery of Goods Between Organizations of MemberCountries of CMEA, reprinted in T.W. HOYA, EAST-WEST TRADE: COMECON LAW, AMERICAN Sovm'T TRADE 384 (1984).

20. Id. at 432. For a commentary on the arbitration provisions of the General Conditions, see Pechota, Council for Mutual Economic Assistance: General Conditions of Delivery of Goods 196811975, 1 WORLD ARm. REP. (Butter.) 211 (1986).
21. Convention on Settlement by Arbitration of Civil Law Disputes Resulting From
Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation, May 26, 1972, reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 5
(1974) [hereinafter Moscow Convention]. The Moscow Convention was adopted by Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Rumania and the USSR. Id.
22. See Capatina, L'arbitrage du commerce exterieur selon Ia Convention de Moscou
de 1972, 102 J. DROIT INT'L 503 (1975); Lebedev, supra note 6, at 117; HANDBOOK COM.
ARB., supra note 6, at 103; Pechota, Moscow Convention on Settlement by Arbitrationof
Civil Law Disputes Resulting from Economic, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation,
1972, 1 WORLD ARB. REP. (Butter.) 217 (1986); Trammer, La Convention de Moscou sur
l'arbitrage du 26 mai 1972, in ASsOCIAZIONE ITALIANA PER ARITRATO, ESSAYS IN
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tional relations, which excludes the ordinary courts from dealing with
commercial and other economic cases.21 The Convention also confers
exclusive jurisdiction over such disputes on permanent arbitration bodies. Article I(1) of the Moscow Convention substantially extended the
duty to arbitrate, beyond Section 90(1) of the CMEA General Conditions, by requiring that:
[a]ll disputes between economic organizations resulting from
contractual and other civil law cases arising between them in
the course of economic, scientific and technical cooperation of
the countries-parties to the present Convention shall be subject to arbitration proceedings with the exclusion of the above
disputes from jurisdiction of the courts of law. "
Unlike in domestic economic arbitration, however, claims disputing the obligation to conclude a contract or to accept special contractual clauses are declared unarbitrable.16 Forum shopping is severely
limited by a rule establishing jurisdiction in the tribunal of the defendant's country, unless the parties agree to arbitrate in a third CMEA
country. 2 Detailed provisions deal with the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. These awards are given full faith and credit
and are subject to enforcement in all other CMEA countries.2 ' Enforcement is subject to the condition that the award has been brought to
execution within two years from its issue. 28 Recognition and enforcement may be refused only on one of the following grounds: (a) when
the award was rendered by a tribunal that lacked jurisdiction;
(b) when the unsuccessful party furnishes proof that it was deprived of
the possibility of defense owing to violations of procedural rules; or,
(c) when the unsuccessful party shows that the award has been set
aside or suspended under the law of the country in which it was
made.2 9 Except in cases where the award has been set aside or suspended, the refusal to enforce an award does not preclude the winning
party from instituting a new proceeding before the competent arbitral
body within three months of the date of refusal.3 0 It is no surprise that
MEMORIAM EUGENIO MINOLI
MUNICAZIONE

E STUDI

UNIVERSITA DI MILANO

517 (1974); Ustor, Arbitrationin CMEA Countries, in Com-

DELL'ISTITUTO DI Dmrr-ro INTERNAZIONALE

957 (1975).

23.
24.

See Samuels, supra note 1, at 425 n.37.
Moscow Convention, supra note 21, § 1(1).

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§ I(1).
§ II(1).
§ IV(2).
§ IV(5).
Id. § V.
Id. § V(1)-(2).

E

STRANIERO DELLA
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the public policy defense is not admissible under the Moscow Convention. According to socialist legal doctrine, awards rendered in accordance with the laws of one socialist country cannot be contested in
another socialist country on the ground that they violate the latter's
public policy. Based on the same class foundations and pursuing the
same social and political objectives, the legal systems of all socialist
countries are said to be in harmony, and thus no conflicts can arise
when they interact. In contrast, the defense of public policy applies
where antagonistic interests, as embodied in the law, come into conflict, as is often the case when awards rendered by capitalist tribunals
are to be enforced in a socialist country.
The Moscow Convention seems to displace the 1958 New York
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards (New York Convention), which the USSR and other CMEA
members have signed and ratified."1 This follows from the provision of
the Moscow Convention that precludes the application of previously
concluded treaties, bilateral or multilateral, on the subject (Section
VI(1)).32 Whether the New York Convention is excluded under the
ideologically motivated doctrine that "socialist" international law is superior to general international law and, therefore, takes priority over
the latter, or whether the New York Convention is rendered inapplicable because the Moscow Convention's lex specialis supersedes the New
York Convention's lex generalis is of little consequence. The fact remains that since the adoption of the Moscow Convention, there has not
been a case in which the court of a CMEA country has applied the
New York Convention to enforce an award rendered by the arbitral
tribunal of another CMEA country.
The second common CMEA objective, unification of the rules of
arbitral procedure, was achieved in 1974 when the Executive Committee of the CMEA adopted the Uniform Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Courts of the Chambers of Commerce of Member States and the
Schedule of Arbitration Fees, Costs and Expenses of the Parties (Uniform Rules)."' The CMEA Uniform Rules were developed after a com31. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter N.Y.
Convention].
32. See Moscow Convention, supra note 21, at 9.
33. For the original Russian text of the Uniform Rules, see Sovir EKONOMICHESKOI
VZAIMOPOMOSHCHI,

SEKRETARIAT,

REGLAMENTY

ARBITRAZHNYKH

SUDOV

PRI

TORGOVYKH

PALATAKH STRAN-CHLENOV SEV 5 (1976). For an English translation, see 3 WORLD ASB.
REP. (Butter.) 3576 (1987); 1 Y.B. COM. ARE. 147 (1976). For commentaries see Lebedev,

supra note 6, at 125-26; Lunts, Unifikatsia pravil proizvodstva del vo vneshnetorgovykh
arbitrazhnykh sudakh pri torgovykh palatakh strachlenov SEV, SOVIET Y.B. INT'L L.
226 (1975); Pechota, Council for Mutual Economic Assistance: Uniform Rules of the

N.Y.L. SCH.
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parative study, of the existing rules in different socialist countries, the
1966 Rules of Arbitration of the United Nations Economic Commission
for Europe, and, in particular, the proposed set of international rules
of arbitral procedure drafted by the United Nations Commission for
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) under the name of UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules were most carefully studied."4 The drafters of
the CMEA Rules were not only informed of the UNCITRAL work, but
some of them also took part in it. A comparison of the two sets of rules
leads one to believe that the CMEA Rules were drafted with a view to
attaining a common denominator on a number of subjects. The accompanying resolution recommended that the Uniform Rules be used as a
model for adopting the rules of procedure of national arbitration
courts.3

Based upon this recommendation, the national chambers of commerce have revised their rules.3s The new rules generally embody the
Arbitration Tribunals Attached to the Chambers of Commerce of the CMEA Countries,
3 WORLD ARB.REP. (Butter.) 3573 (1987); Strohbach, New Aspects of Arbitral Jurisdiction in the Member Countries of the Council of Mutual Economic Aid (CMEA), in
INT'L COUNCIL FOR COM. ARE., FIFTH INT'L ARB. CONGRESS: PRO. C Ij 1-6 (1975); Strohbach

& Volter, Die neuen Rechtsgrundlagen der sozialistischen Aussenhandelsschiedsgerichtsbarkeit, 1976 DDR-AUSSNWIRTSCHAFT 37 (Annex).
34. For a discussion of the salient features of the 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules, see 1.1. DORE, ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION UNDER THE UNCITRAL RULES: A
TEXTUAL ANALYSIS (1986); Glossner, Die UNCITRAL-Schiedsordnung in der Praxis, 24
RECHT DEE INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHArr 141 (1978); JENARD, Le r6glement d'arbitrage
de la Commission des Nations Unies pour le droit commercial international,54 R. DR.
INT. DR. Comp. 201 (1977); McClelland, Toward A More Mature System of International
Commercial Arbitration: The Establishment of Uniform Rules of Procedure and the
Elimination of the Conflict of Laws Questions, 5 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 169 (1980);
Pechota, UNCITRAL ArbitrationRules, 3 WORLD ARB. REPORTER (Butter.) 3083 (1987);
Pirrung, Die Schiedsverfahrensordnung der UNCITRAL, 23 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT 513 (1977); Sacerdoti, The New Arbitration Rules of ICC and UNCITRAL, 11 J. WORLD TRADE L. 248 (1977); Sanders, Commentary on UNCITRAL ArbitrationRules, 2 Y.B. CoM. ARB. 172 (1977); Sanders, Proceduresand Practices under the
UNCITRAL Rules, 27 AM. J. Comp. L. 453 (1979); Note, The UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules, 17 HARV. INT'L L.J. 141 (1976).
35. Lebedev, supra note 6, at 125-26.
36. The following courts amended their rules in the following years: Bulgaria in 1974
(the rules were further amended in 1979); Czechoslovakia in 1975; the German Democratic Republic in 1975; Hungary in 1975; Mongolia in 1975; Rumania in 1976; and the
USSR in 1975 and 1988. The above-mentioned arbitration courts apply the adapted
rules to all cases, whether CMEA-related or not. The Court of Arbitration at the Polish
Chamber of Foreign Trade adopted the Uniform Rules in 1975 for disputes between
economic organizations of CMEA countries only, and continues to use its previous Rules
of Procedure (adopted in 1970 and amended in 1974) in arbitrations between Polish and
non-CMEA parties. A third set of rules was adopted by the Polish Court of Arbitration
in 1985 for ad hoc arbitrations administered by the court. See Szurski, Comments on
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following common principles:
(a) The arbitration courts are permanent institutions attached to the
chambers of commerce and composed of a Presidium, a college of
at least fifteen arbitrators, and a secretary;
(b) The arbitration courts are competent to consider all disputes arising out of, or in connection with, contracts or other civil law relations in foreign trade and other matters of economic, scientific,
and technical cooperation between parties of different nationality;
(c) Jurisdiction is derived from either international treaties or the
consent of the parties;
(d) Only a member of the college of arbitrators of the court which has
jurisdiction over the matter may be appointed by each party as an
arbitrator. Where a party fails to make its appointment, the Presidium of the arbitration court has the power to make the necessary appointment. And, the Presidium also appoints the presiding
arbitrator when the two arbitrators fail to agree.
(e) The proceedings are conducted in the language of the country of
the court. The costs of interpretation and translation of documents are borne by the party requesting such services;
(f) As a rule, a case should be disposed of within six months;
(g) Detailed uniform rules govern service of process, the submission
of claims and counter-claims, evidentiary issues, awards, and the
discontinuance of proceedings without award;
(h) There is a uniform schedule of arbitration fees and expenses.
Achieving uniformity in the application of community rules by the
national arbitration courts, the third objective proclaimed by the
CMEA in 1971, has not been neglected. Periodic conferences of the
presidents of arbitral institutions and the regular exchange of reported
cases have effectively furthered this objective.37 Moreover, the CMEA
Conference on Legal Matters has embarked upon a study of the practical application of the Moscow Convention and the Uniform Rules, with
the objective of preparing recommendations on the methods of coordinating the work of national institutions.3" In an arbitration scheme
where international provisions and uniform rules determine essential
aspects of the arbitral process, national institutions necessarily comple"Comparative ArbitrationPractice" as Presented in Four Reports, in COMPARATIVE AR-

169, 171 (1987).
See HanAk, Arbitration in the Socialist Countries, in INTERNATIONAL

BITRATION PRACTICE AND PUBLIC POLICY IN ARBITRATION

37.

FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, SIXTH INTERNATIONAL

COUNCIL

ARBITRATION CONGRESS PROCEED-

(1978).
38. Unification of International Trade Law: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N.
GAOR Comm. on Int'l Trade (16th Sess.) at 13, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9 Add.2 (1983).
INGS 51
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ment the international system.
Arbitration, as a method of settling transnational economic disputes, is preferable to court adjudication principally because arbitration is more readily "internationalized." Court adjudication, on the
other hand, relies on the domestic laws of the respective country. The
process of internationalization has already reached the point where arbitration, at least in disputes between state enterprises of different socialist countries, can be regarded as an internationalprocedure that
makes use of national institutions which function as local outposts of
the international system.

III.

THE ROLE OF NATIONAL LEGISLATION

The relationship between the increasingly unified system of international commercial arbitration and municipal legislation raises a significant question: To what extent does municipal law actually control
the arbitral process in CMEA countries?
Like other countries whose legal institutions stem from civil law,
most CMEA nations regulate private arbitration, either totally or partially, in their codes of civil procedure." Two countries, Czechoslovakia
and the German Democratic Republic, have also enacted separate statutes that deal exclusively with international commercial arbitration. 0
Rules of general application that envisage recourse to arbitration are
also contained in the laws and regulations concerning economic cooperation among foreign entities, joint ventures and foreign investment."
39. BULGARIAN CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, arts. 9(l), 237 and 242; CZECHOSLOVAK
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, §§ 106, 251-271; GDR CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, art. 208;
HUNGARIAN CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, arts. 360-364; POLISH CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,
arts. 695-715; RUMANIAN CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, arts. 341-370; FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE of the USSR and Union Republics, arts. 58 and 63 [hereinafter
Fundamental Principles]; RSFSR Code of Civil Procedure, arts. 23, 46, 129, 155, 219,
338, 437 and Supplement No. 3 to the Code, and corresponding provisions of the codes of
civil procedure of other Soviet republics.
40. Czechoslovakia: Act Relating to Arbitration in International Trade and to Enforcement of Awards, 1963 (No. 68/1963 Coll. of Laws) [hereinafter Czechoslovakia Act
of 1963]. For an English translation, see 7 BULL. CZECH. L. 269 (1963); German Democratic Republic: Ordinance on Arbitration Proceedings, 1975, GB1. I DDR8 (1976) (English translation by the GDR Court of Arbitration).
41. Bulgaria: Decree No. 533 of 1980, On Economic Cooperation Between Bulgarian
Juridical and Physical Persons, arts. 6, 27; Czechoslovakia: Act Concerning Economic
Contacts with Foreign Countries, 1980 (No. 42/1980 Coll. of Laws), §§ 47-48; Rumania:
Decree No. 424 of 1972, On Joint Companies, art. 38; USSR: Decree of the Presidium of
the USSR Supreme Soviet of Jan. 13, 1987 on Questions Connected with the Creation on
the Territory of the USSR and the Activity of Joint Enterprises, International Associations, and Organizations with the Participation of Soviet and Foreign Organizations,
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Although there is considerable diversity among the CMEA countries
regarding the legislative regulation of arbitral proceedings, no serious
attempt has been made to harmonize provisions of the codes of civil
procedure in this area. In fact, there is hardly any need for such harmonization, since these general provisions are of little practical significance to arbitration within the CMEA.
The principal purpose of the codes of civil procedure is to provide
legal rules applicable to the arbitral process in its traditional, pre-socialist form, as it is generally known and practiced in international
commercial relations. These codes are maintained in the national legislation of socialist countries since approximately twenty to forty percent
of their foreign trade (the proportion varies depending on the economic
policy of the respective country) is with non-socialist countries and is
carried on in accordance with general international standards. A typical case in which the codes of civil procedure apply is where the settlement of a dispute is an ad hoc arbitration proceeding involving a party
from a Western or Third World country and taking place in the respective socialist country. Such proceedings, however, are extremely rare.
When a Western firm agrees to arbitrate in a CMEA country, it usually
does so for particular reasons and generally accepts the jurisdiction
and rules of procedure of a permanent arbitration body. In such a case,
the code of civil procedure is not controlling.""
Why are the codes of civil procedure given so little leeway in matters of international commercial arbitration? The main reason is that
in this area, specific rules and regulations have replaced more general
provisions of the codes of civil procedure. As a general legal regulation,
the code of civil procedure applies only in the absence of special regulation. Where special provisions have been enacted, they take preceFirms, and Agencies of Administration, para. 5, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 759 (1987); Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers of Jan. 13, 1987 on the Procedure for the Creation
on the Territory of the USSR and the Activities of Joint Enterprises with the Participation of Soviet Organizations and Firms of Capitalist and Developing Countries, para. 20,
reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 749 (1987).
42. See generally Chew, supra note 16; Domke, The Israeli-Soviet Oil Arbitration,
53 Am. J. INT'L L. 787 (1959); Hob6r, Arbitration in Moscow, 3 APB. INT'L 119 (1987);
Leff, The Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission of the USSR and the West, 24 ARE. J.
1 (1969); Lunts, Arbitrazh po sporam sovetskikh khozaistvennykh organizatsii s
kapitalisticheskimi predpriatiami,1979 Sova'rsKoE GOSUDARSTVo i. PRAvo 50; Orlov, Arbitration Procedure in East-West Trade, 55 NoRDic J. INT'L L. 310 (1986); Pfaff,
Neuerungen der internationalenSchiedsgerichtsbarkeit im Ost-West-Handel vor den
stlindigen Aussenhandelsschiedsgerichtender GRW-Lander, 23 RzCHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WmTSCHArr 125 (1977); Note, The Case for FTAC Arbitration of Disputes
Between Soviet Enterprises and American Firms, 14 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 302
(1975); Strohbach, Arbitration between Foreign Trade Organizations of Socialist Countries and Parties from the Capitalist Economic Sphere, 4 PACE L. Rav. 607 (1984).
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dence over the general regime. Such special provisions generally are of
two kinds: they either emanate from an international treaty, such as
the Moscow Convention of 1972, or they may be embodied in an institutional arrangement and the rules of procedure of a permanent arbitration body.
The preeminence of an international treaty over national legislation in matters of arbitration is established by various statutes."' Likewise, the statutory instruments and rules of procedure of most arbitration institutions in the CMEA countries, which-unlike similar
institutional arrangements and rules in the West-constitute genuine
legal norms emanating from public bodies authorized to legislate, 4
have the effect of superseding more general legal rules in the areas of
their application. These procedural rules are given priority on the theory that, as particular legal norms, they constitute a lex specialis that
5
overrules the lex generalis on the same subject.
As we have seen, these statutory instruments and rules of procedure are the prime targets of unification within the CMEA, while the
codes of civil procedure remain relatively free from such influence. As a
result of the harmonizing of CMEA arbitration rules, the national
codes of civil procedure have lost a great deal of control over the arbi43. See Czechoslovakia Arbitration Act of 1963, supra note 40, § 35, which provides
that "This Act shall apply, unless an international treaty, binding on the Czechoslovak
Socialist Republic, contains a different provision." See also GDR Arbitration Ordinance,
supra note 40, art. 33, which provides that "The provisions of this Ordinance shall not
apply if international treaties to which the German Democratic Republic is a party provide otherwise;" and Fundamental Principles, supra note 39, art. 64, which provides that
"In those instances when other rules are established by an international treaty or international agreement in which the USSR participates than those which are contained in
the present Fundamental Principles, the rules of the international treaty or international
agreement shall be applied."
44. Thus, the new Statute of the Court of Arbitration at the USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry was approved by the Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme
Soviet of Dec. 14, 1987; the Rules of Procedure of the Arbitration Court of the Czechoslovak Chamber of Commerce and Industry [hereinafter Czechoslovak Rules] were
promulgated by Decree No. 47 of 1974 (later revised by Decree No. 104 of 1981) and
were published in the Collection of Laws; the Regulations Relating to the Organization
and Working of the Rumanian Arbitration Commission (Rules of Procedure) [hereinafter
Rumanian Rules] were approved by the Decree of the State Council of 1976 (No. 18 of
1976). With the exception of Czechoslovakia and Rumania, the procedural rules for arbitration courts in Eastern Europe have not been published in statutory form. The Bulgarian, GDR, Hungarian, Soviet and Polish non-CMEA procedural rules [hereinafter Bulgarian Rules, GDR Rules, Hungarian Rules, Soviet Rules, Polish non-CMEA Rules] may
be obtained by writing to a particular court, and a compilation of the procedural rules of
national institutions in various countries was published in 4 WORLD ARB. REP. (Butter.)
(1989).
45. See V. SEDLACEK, supra note 11, at 91.
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tral process. The few areas in which the codes of civil procedure are
still influential include ad hoc arbitration (a procedure that is almost
extinct), judicial recognition of arbitration agreements, and the enforcement of arbitral awards.
Like domestic economic arbitration, international commercial arbitration has undergone an almost complete separation from the general procedural law of each country in favor of a distinct organizational
and procedural format. There is no indication that any CMEA country
presently contemplates a revision of its arbitration legislation, taking
into account the provisions of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration.4 6 However, such revision may become
desirable when the value of uniformity is underscored by increased economic contacts with the rest of the world.
IV.

INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

Whether seen as an adjudicator of transnational disputes arising
between enterprises of the CMEA countries, or as a forum for resolution of controversies in the broader context of foreign trade, arbitration
in the USSR and Eastern Europe rests on the bedrock of permanent
institutions.
Permanent courts of arbitration operate within the chambers of
commerce, and like their sponsoring institutions, are public organizations. The arbitration courts' public character implies a measure of political control, especially with regard to the political screening of professional personnel, including arbitrators.
The structure of these permanent courts consists of a Presidium
(or president), a college of arbitrators and a secretary (or secretariat).
The powers and responsibilities of each institutional component are
46. The Model Law was adopted by the U.N. Commission on International Trade
Law in 1985. For the text and commentary, see Shifman, UNCITRAL Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration, 1 WORLD Ames. REP. (Butter.) 135.2 (1986). See
also Fleischhauer, UNCITRAL Model Law on InternationalCommercial Arbitration, 41
ARB. J. 17 (1986); Herrmann, UNCITRAL Adopts Model Law on InternationalCommercial Arbitration, 2 ARB. INT'L 2 (1986); Hoellering, The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 20 INT'L L. 327 (1986); Lucio, The UNCITRAL
MODEL Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 17 U. MIAMI IWER-AM. L. REV.
313 (1986); McNerney & Esplugues, InternationalCommercial Arbitration: The UNCITRAL Model Law, 9 B.C. INT'L & Comp. L. REv. 47 (1986); Paulsson, Report on the
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration as Adopted in Vienna on 21 June 1985, 52 ArB. 98 (1986); Strohbach, Mustergesetz i0ber die internationale Handelsschiedsgerichtsbarkeit:UNCITRAL-Modelgesetz 1985, 93 RECHT IM AusSENHANDEL I (No. 93); Szasz, Introduction to the Model Law of UNCITRAL on
InternationalCommercial Arbitration, 24 RASSEGNA DELL'ABsrrRATO 5 (1984).
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precisely defined in the rules pertaining to the organization and procedure of the courts of arbitration. Thus, the Presidium decides questions of policy, appoints arbitrators and performs its other delegated
responsibilities." The arbitrators, either individually or in panels of
three, conduct proceedings and issue decisions. The Secretary is the
administrative officer of the arbitration court and performs various responsibilities on behalf of the court."
The organizational framework and distribution of duties among
the three structural elements permits the arbitration court to effectively administer its affairs and develop the public support required to
secure adequate resources. It also ensures functional continuity and
contributes to the consistency and predictability of arbitral
adjudication.'
Most of the permanent courts have been in existence for a long
time. The Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission in Moscow (since
January 1, 1988, the Court of Arbitration at the USSR Chamber of
Commerce and Industry), for instance, was established in 1932 and has
evolved into a major arbitral center.50

47. For example, the Board (Presidium) of the Czechoslovak Arbitration Court has
nine members elected by the Chamber of Commerce and Industry for a period of three
years. The Board: (1) supervises the conduct of arbitration proceedings as authorized by
§ 3(3) of the Czechoslovak Rules, supra note 44; (2) approves the inclusion of qualified
candidates in the list of arbitrators, and decides on a removal from the list, id. § 5(2); (3)
decides on the challenge of arbitrators, id. § 24(2); and (4) resolves issues of jurisdiction,
id. § 25.
The President of the Board has the power to: (1) issue letters rogatory to foreign
courts and other authorities, id. § 11(7); (2) stay arbitration proceedings pending completion of the process of appointing arbitrators, id. § 12; (3) appoint arbitrators at the request of respective parties, id. §§ 19(1)(e), 22(3) or, when the parties fail to appoint a
sole arbitrator or the defendant fails to appoint his arbitrator, id. § 23 or when appointed arbitrators fail to elect the presiding arbitrator, id. § 23(2); (4) take necessary
procedural actions pending constitution of a tribunal, id. § 23(5); (5) co-sign arbitral
awards, id. § 37(2); and (6) issue decrees of discontinuance pending constitution of a
tribunal, id. § 42(3).
48. The Secretary, under the Czechoslovak Rules, organizes the work of the court and
performs specific functions which include assistance in conducting arbitral proceedings,
keeping records of each proceeding, co-signing arbitral awards, and certifying decisions
and other official documents of the Arbitration Court. Id. §§ 6(1), 37(2).
49. "The decisions [of the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission], unlike the decisions of ad hoc tribunals, establish a consistent practice known to all parties to future
disputes." VN-SHNETORGOVyi ARBrrRASH 5 (Moscow 1941).
50. See Pozdnyakov, 50 let Vneshentorgovoi arbitrazhnoi homissii, 7
39 (1982).
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V.

THE ARBITRATORS

An arbitrator in the CMEA system has a permanent status and
clearly defined rights and duties. An arbitrator cannot be validly appointed to hear a case unless he is a member of the college of arbitrators at the court with jurisdiction over the matter.51 His name must
appear on the list or roster which also specifies the profession and occupation of the arbitrator, academic degree or title, specialization and
place of residence.52 The list from which arbitrators are chosen must
contain a minimum of fifteen names. The members of the college receive their commission from the executive body of the chamber of commerce, or in some cases, from the Presidium of the arbitration court.
The same body which authorizes their inclusion on the roster may also
order their deletion from the list. In most countries the college of arbitrators is little more than a pool of available adjudicators. Bulgaria is
the only country where the college functions as a deliberative and decision-making body; it elects the president and vice-president of the arbitration court, decides matters concerning the conduct of arbitrators,
analyzes the court's practice, examines important legal problems and
approves annual reports on the court's activities."

VI.

THE NATIONALITY OF ARBITRATORS

In view of the fact that, with the exception of Hungary, the parties
to a dispute are bound to select their arbitrators from a list established
by the arbitral institution, the traditional freedom to appoint arbitrators possessing particular skills and expertise is somewhat limited.
That freedom is further curtailed by the prevailing requirements regarding the eligibility of a person to be included on the roster of arbitrators. An important question is whether a foreign national can appear on the list. The CMEA Uniform Rules, as well as those of the
German Democratic Republic, Romania and the USSR, are silent on
this matter. The practice of these countries, however, has been not to
51. Only Hungary permits a foreign party to appoint a foreign arbitrator whose name
is not included in the roster kept by the Hungarian Arbitration Court. See Hungarian
Rules, supra note 44, § 4(2).
52. See Uniform Rules, supra note 33, § 4(1); Bulgarian Rules, supra note 44, § 4;
Czechoslovak Rules, supra note 44, § 5; see also GDR Rules, supra note 44, § 4; Hungarian Rules, supra note 44, § 4; Rumanian Rules, supra note 44, § 8; Soviet Rules,
supra note 44, § 4. The Polish non-CMEA Rules require that the list also show the
nationality of the arbitrator, if he is not a Polish citizen. Polish non-CMEA Rules, supra
note 44, § 4(3).
53. Bulgarian Rules, supra note 44, § 5.
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appoint foreigners as arbitrators. And, Bulgaria's arbitration court expressly prohibits the choice of a non-citizen. 4
Conversely, several arbitration courts allow, in principle, the entry
of foreign nationals on the list of arbitrators. The Czechoslovak Rules
contain an explicit provision that Czechoslovak citizenship is not a re5
quirement of being an arbitrator.6
Similarly, the Polish non-CMEA
Rules appear to admit foreign nationals to the college of arbitrators. 6
The Hungarian Rules, however, offer a different solution. While silent
on the question of whether a foreign national may enter the Hungarian
list of arbitrators, the rules permit the appointment of a foreigner as
an arbitrator even though the person is not a member of the college of
arbitrators, provided that: (1) only a foreign party to the arbitration
proceedings may appoint a foreign national as its arbitrator; and
(2) the foreign party's home country must be one that allows a Hungarian citizen to act as an arbitrator within its jurisdiction. 57
Commentators in the West are often surprised that a tribunal, sitting in Moscow and settling a dispute between a Bulgarian and a Soviet foreign trade organization, for example, cannot include a Bulgarian
national as one of the arbitrators and, conversely, why a panel resolving a controversy between a Soviet and a Bulgarian enterprise in Sofia
cannot have as a member a Soviet national. The rigidity of this seemingly nationalistic principle can perhaps be explained by the traditional Soviet reluctance to open up its institutions to foreign influence.
The notion that the participation of foreigners in the decision-making
processes of a Soviet institution would encroach upon national sovereignty is apparently still very much part of Soviet bureaucratic psychology. Although international treaties binding upon the USSR and
most other members of the CMEA provide that foreign nationals may
be appointed as arbitrators, 8 the drafters of the CMEA Uniform Rules
chose to ignore them. The silence of the Uniform Rules may be interpreted as non-recognition of the right of a foreign party to appoint a
foreign national as its arbitrator.
It is encouraging, however, that the issue is hotly debated among
Soviet jurists. 1.0. Khlestova, author of a monograph on international
commercial arbitration within the CMEA, calls for a change in both
The Court of Arbitration Rules and the CMEA Uniform Rules, that
would enable foreign parties to choose foreign nationals whose names
54. "The arbitrators included in the list shall be Bulgarian citizens ....
" Id. § 4(3).
55. Czechoslovak Rules, supra note 44, § 5(3).
56. Polish non-CMEA Rules, supra note 44, § 4(3).
57. Hungarian Rules, supra note 44, § 4(2).
58. See European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Apr. 21,
1961, art. I1, 484 U.N.T.S.
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are on the list of arbitrators of their respective arbitration court. Aware
that the lists presently include only nationals of the country of that
forum, Khlestova proposes either adding foreign arbitrators to the existing lists or inviting national arbitration institutions to establish combined lists for two or more countries.59

VII. QUALIFICATIONS
A person cannot be included in the list of arbitrators unless he
possesses the qualifications required by the rules of the arbitral institution. The Uniform Rules are intentionally general, stating in section 4
that the lists will include only those persons who possess the necessary
knowledge and capabilities to resolve disputes arising in foreign trade
and technical and industrial cooperation. The general nature of this
provision, which mirrors Section 4(1) of the Soviet Rules, enables the
screening body to apply policy-oriented criteria during the selection
process for positions within the nomenciaturaY° Nonetheless, some national rules require additional qualifications, often including the requirement of "necessary knowledge" and "capabilities" in areas germane to international commercial arbitration. Additional criteria also
include the absence of any prior convictions 1 and a knowledge of
law.2
In principle, the parties to an arbitration agreement may prescribe
the qualifications that their arbitrators must possess. The adversaries
cannot, however, invoke their agreement as a ground for refusing the
appointment of an arbitrator from the list established by the arbitral
institution. The parties are required to make every effort to choose arbitrators from the list who possess the stipulated qualifications, and
under no circumstances may the parties appoint an outside arbitrator
even if the outsider is more qualified. This raises an issue which is not
1.0. KHLESTOVA, supra note 6, at 119-21.
60. The nomenclaturain the USSR and elsewhere in Eastern Europe is the category
of positions that can be filled only with prior approval of the candidate by a competent
Party organ. Typical requirements are the political reliability of the applicant, absence
of commitments to religion or non-Marxist political ideologies, and active involvement in
public causes. A candidate who is a member of the Party is deemed to meet these requirements automatically. Non-members have to offer proof that they qualify for a
nomenclatura position. The office of arbitrator undoubtedly falls within the
nomenclatura.
61. Bulgarian Rules, supra note 44, § 4.
62. Id. See also Czechoslovak Rules; supra note 44, § 5(3); Hungarian Rules, supra
note 44, § 4(1); Polish non-CMEA Rules, supra note 44, § 4(3); Rumanian Rules, supra
note 44, art. 8.
59.
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regulated by the Uniform Rules, namely, whether liability may exist
based on the negligence or inability of the arbitrator, and if so, to
whom this liability extends. In the West, an arbitrator may be liable if
he or she does not perform with due diligence, although the parties
bear some of the responsibility if they have not chosen an honest or
qualified arbitrator. 6" In the USSR and Eastern Europe, liability
should probably fall on the arbitral institution that screened the arbitrator before placing his name on the list. By requiring the parties to
select their arbitrators from a prescribed list, the arbitral institution
implicitly guarantees that the arbitrators on the list meet the criteria
established by the rules and the arbitration agency must assume responsibility if an arbitrator's qualifications fall short of those demanded and expected.
Impartiality and the absence of bias are two principles upon which
both the Uniform Rules and the national rules place special emphasis.
The relevant provisions explicitly state that the arbitrator does not represent the interests of either of the parties." Some of the national
rules also stipulate that the arbitrators are bound to secrecy.' 5
CMEA arbitrators usually do not maintain personal contacts with
the adverse parties. In Western arbitration, however, ex parte communication between the arbitrator and the party that appointed him is, in
many instances, specifically permitted. That the three arbitrators in a
CMEA case are members of the same college of arbitrators, and that
their links to the arbitral institution are stronger than those to the parties that have chosen them, ensure a proper degree of detachment.
Only in exceptional circumstances, particularly when higher interests
than those of a particular party are involved, may the principle of independence be broken. These factors explain why there has been little
need for a code of ethics governing the personal conduct of CMEA
arbitrators.
There are detailed provisions in the Uniform Rules governing the
challenge and removal of arbitrators. In order to challenge an arbitrator's impartiality, one must show that an arbitrator is personally interested in the outcome of the proceedings." Typical cases are those
where the arbitrator is the officer of an organization or agency to which
63. R.

DAVID, ARBITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE

274 (1985).

64. Uniform Rules, supra note 33, § 4(2); Bulgarian Rules, supra note
Czechoslovak Rules, supra note 44, § 4(1); GDR Rules, supra note 44; § 4(3);
Rules, supra note 44, § 4(4); Polish non-CMEA Rules, supra note 44, § 16(1);
Rules, supra note 44, art. 8; Soviet Rules, supra note 44, § 4(2).
65. GDR Rules, supra note 44, § 4(3); Polish non-CMEA Rules, supra
16(1).
66. Uniform Rules, supra note 33, § 20(1).

44, § 4(4);
Hungarian
Rumanian
note 44, §
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the party that appointed him is affiliated. As a safeguard, the Uniform
Rules and most of the national rules require an arbitrator to disqualify
himself if, as a result of the relationship with the appointing party, the
arbitrator's impartiality might be compromised.6 7 The challenge of an
arbitrator is decided by the other members of the tribunal. If they are
unable to agree, the matter is removed to the Presidium of the arbitration court.

VIII.

THE CONSTrUTION OF A TRIBUNAL

A case may be assigned either to a sole arbitrator or to a tribunal
of three arbitrators. In general, arbitrators are appointed in a manner
similar to that used in the West. The sole arbitrator is chosen, by mutual agreement of the parties, from the list of arbitrators of the arbitration court that has jurisdiction in the matter. If the parties fail to agree
on an arbitrator within the prescribed period of time, the sole arbitrator is appointed by the president of the arbitration court."' To establish a three member CMEA tribunal, the plaintiff may initially include
the name of an arbitrator in his statement of claim. Alternatively, the
plaintiff may request the president of the arbitration court to make the
appointment." Given the limited choice, there is little practical difference between the two alternatives. Thus, the latter course of action is
chosen more frequently by plaintiffs than ,the former.
Within thirty days after receiving the statement of claim, the defendant is required to appoint his arbitrator or to assign the task to the
president of the arbitration court. Neither procedure, as practice demonstrates, places the defendant at an advantage. Should the defendant
fail to exercise his option, the second arbitrator is chosen by the president of the arbitration court.7 0 Thus, under the CMEA system of arbitration, it is virtually impossible for a defendant to obstruct the makeup of the tribunal.
As in other systems, the presiding arbitrator is chosen by the two
appointed arbitrators. If they disagree, the presiding arbitrator is chosen by the president of the arbitration court.7 1 Significantly, the presi67. Id.; Bulgarian Rules, supra note 44, § 25(1); Polish non-CMEA Rules, supra note
44, § 16(1); Rumanian Rules, supra note 44, § 26; Soviet Rules, supra note 44, § 22.
68. Uniform Rules, supra note 33, § 19; Bulgarian Rules, supra note 44, § 23; Czechoslovak Rules, supra note 44, § 23(4); GDR Rules, supra note 44, § 19; Hungarian Rules,
supra note 44, § 19; Rumanian Rules, supra note 44, § 23; Soviet Rules, supra note 44, §
19.
69. Uniform Rules, supra note 33, § 14(2)(e); see also corresponding provisions of the
national rules.
70. Id. § 17(3).
71. Id. §18.
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dent's power of appointment in selecting an arbitrator or the presiding
arbitrator is exclusive. No third party, not even a court of justice, can
make such appointments.
An interesting feature of the arbitration system is the procedure
for the appointment of substitute arbitrators. These are appointed at
the same time and in the same manner as primary arbitrators; the parties, however, are free to forego the appointment. 2 This is a facultative
procedure designed to ensure the smooth replacement of a resigning or
incapacitated arbitrator during the proceeding.

IX.

POWERS OF ARBITRATORS

The powers of CMEA arbitrators are not dependent upon the
agreement of the parties, but are conferred on them by the rules of the
arbitration court. The powers may be generally classified as follows:
(a) The power to decide on jurisdiction.Surprisingly, there is no uniform rule on this issue. Some national rules vest the power in the
arbitrators that hear the case. 3 Other rules introduce a two-tier
system: the tribunal decides on its jurisdiction, but the dissatisfied party may appeal the decision. The power to decide the appeal vests in the Presidium of the arbitration court. 4 Other rules,
however, confer the power to determine jurisdiction on the
Presidium."
(b) The power to determine the value of the claim. When the plaintiff fails to state the value of the claim, or states it incorrectly, the
arbitration court has the duty to determine the value, either on
its own initiative or at the request of the defendant. 7 The na77
tional rules specify how this power is exercised.
(c) The power to decide the case. This power is vested exclusively in
the arbitrators who have heard the case. Their decision may be in
the form of an award or ruling. An award is made when the case is
decided on its merits or when the parties reach a settlement in the
course of the arbitration proceedings and ask for an award confirming its terms." A ruling terminates the proceedings when the
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
garian
supra
78.

Id. §§ 14(2)(e), 17(3).
Bulgarian Rules, supra note 44, art 8(4); Soviet Rules, supra note 44, § 1(3).
Polish non-CMEA Rules, supra note 44, § 17.
Czechoslovak Rules, supra note 44, § 25.
Uniform Rules, supra note 33, § 15(4).
Bulgarian Rules, supra.note44, § 20(4); GDR Rules, supra note 44, § 15(1); HunRules, supra note 44, § 15(5); Rumanian Rules, supra note 44, § 12; Soviet Rules,
note 44, § 15(4).
Uniform Rules, supra note 33, § 30; see also corresponding provisions of the na-
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plaintiff withdraws his statement of claim, when the parties reach
settlement and ask for an award to confirm its terms, or when,
owing to the parties' inaction, it is impossible to decide the case."
As an exceptional remedy, the Rumanian Rules permit a
party to request a reexamination of the tribunal's decision.8 0 Unless the parties select other arbitrators, the petition is considered
by the same panel that made the decision. If the arbitrators decide in favor of reexamination, the original award is suspended
and, if granted, the appellate award replaces the original award."'

CONCLUSIONS

Similar to the courts of justice, the arbitration system in the
USSR and Eastern Europe is an institution of public, not private, law.
The arbitrator is not an agent of the party that appointed him, nor
does he follow its directives. All members of an arbitration tribunal,
not just the presiding arbitrator, are neutral arbitrators using their
own judgment.
The strict separation of international commercial arbitration from
domestic economic arbitration makes it possible to grant arbitrators a
great measure of autonomy from national law, resulting in better integration of arbitration within the regional system.
Arbitration proceedings in the USSR and Eastern Europe are free
from judicial control. The powers of the courts of justice are limited
almost entirely to the declaration and the enforcement of awards. Judicial intervention to compel arbitration, appoint arbitrators, assist in
procedural matters and grant remedies during arbitration proceedings
is generally unavailable. The appointment of arbitrators and general
control over the proceedings are entrusted to the Presidium of the arbitration court.
As a rule, arbitration proceedings are public matters, and as a result, there is no reason to withhold the reporting and publication of
arbitral awards. Accordingly, reports on selected cases are released for
publication by most institutions. To this end, the CMEA arbitration
system seems to be reaping the fruits of publication described in recent
literature. s2
tional
79.
tional
80.
81.
82.

rules.
Uniform Rules, supra note 33, § 36; see also corresponding provisions of the narules.
Rumanian Rules, supra note 44, § 49.
Id.
As one commentator notes:
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The arbitral systems continue to evolve in response to society's
needs and new developments are anticipated in several key areas. One
of the expected reforms is the recognition of the right to designate foreign nationals as arbitrators. Such a change is long overdue and there
seems to be a growing awareness of this need. This would involve a
revision of the existing Uniform Rules and, more importantly, the
adoption of practical steps toward implementation. Another issue
which requires attention is the procedure for setting aside arbitral
awards. Several commentators favor an arbitral, rather than judicial,
mechanism that would enable the arbitration court to revert to its position before rendering the award. A third possible area of future development is the unification of rules concerning the enforcement of
awards, hopefully to be adopted by a regional convention on the extraterritorial validity and enforcement of arbitral awards.

Publication of arbitral awards can serve numerous beneficial purposes. First,
it will greatly improve the selection process. One of the most effective ways of
judging the qualities of a prospective arbitrator is to study the awards he has
rendered. Second, it will contribute to the quality, consistency, and predictability of arbitral adjudication. Arbitrators frequently expend considerable efforts in
providing proper reasoning for their awards. Their analysis may contribute significantly to the development of the law and be authoritative sources of law in
the steadily developing field of international commerce. Third, the knowledge
that their awards will be published and read by others will encourage arbitrators
to be most diligent in the discharge of their tasks. Fourth, the publication of
awards will add greatly to the acceptability and status of international commercial arbitration.
Smit, The Future of International Commercial Arbitration, 2 WEST's INT'L L. BULL. 6
(1984).

